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Each country has developed, according to the needs and specificity of the environment where the companies operate 
their businesses, its own corporate governance system. At global level, there are two main models of corporate 
governance taken into account: the shareholder system (United Kingdom, USA); the stakeholder system (Japan, most 
Latin and Continental European countries). The German company Bayer AG has adopted the stakeholder model to form 
its corporate governance system and, therefore, does not limit itself to the protection of stakeholders, as in the case of 
the English-American area A specific feature of the German corporate law is the separation between the Management 
Board ("Vorstand") and the Supervisory Board ("Aufsichtsrat"). This two-tier management system is also adopted by 
Bayer AG. It is rigorously forbidden to the members of one board to be, also, members of the other board. The German 
Supervisory Boards are unique due to the German law of co-determination, according to which it is mandatory for these 
boards to be composed by an equal number of representatives of stakeholders and employees. The role of Bayer AG 
Supervisory Board (formed by 20 members) is to monitor and guide the Management Board. In order to increase its 
efficiency in task fulfillment, Bayer AG Supervisory Board set up five committees – the Presidial Committee, the Audit 
Committee, the Human Resources Committee, the Nominations Committee and the Innovation Committee. The 
Supervisory Board operate in compliance with the German Stock Corporation Act and the German Corporate 
Governance Code. In average, the Supervisory Board has about 13 members and 2,3 committees. In the case of Bayer 
AG company, the Management Board is composed only by intern directors, having the role of company management 
and representation, while the Supervisory Board is formed exclusively by external directors. Obviously, the share 
structure is of concentrate type, thus supporting the long term investment horizons. 
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In the specialized literature are various 
descriptions of the corporate governance. One of 
them defines the corporate governance as being 
“...framework of laws, rules, and procedures that 
regulate the interactions and relationships between 
the providers of capital, the governing body, senior 
managers and other parties that take part to 
varying degrees in the decision making process 
and are themselves affected by the company’s 
dispositions and business activities” (Mendez A. 
M., 2011). More briefly, the corporate governance 
is the system of institutions and rules that 
determines the control and direction of the 
corporation and that indicates the relationship 
among the corporation’s major participants (Tekin 
N., 2014). 
The corporate governance systems differ in 
the whole world because of the various laws and 
cultures among the countries. At global level, there 
are two main models of corporate governance 
taken into account: the shareholder system (United 
Kingdom, USA) and the stakeholder system 
(Japan, most Latin and Continental European 
countries). These two systems have considerably 
different structures and aims. 
The shareholder model, known also under 
the name of outsider model, is a market-based 
system, characterized by the existence of the 
dispersed shareholders and the prevalence of the 
shareholders' approach, the financing being mainly 
accomplished by the participation of investors to 
the social capital of enterprises. The stakeholder 
system or the insider model is founded on the 
relations among peoples, being characterised by 
the concentrated structure of the shareholders and 
the existernce of a low number of creditors and 
participants to the social capital, the supervision 
being delegated to the banks (Maassen G.F., 2002). 
Germany, a leading country with a large 
industrial and manufacturing sector, has adopted 
the stakeholder model of corporate governance 
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system, with the aim to balance the interests of all 
stakeholders. 
Germany is considered a classic case of 
“non-shareholder value orientation”, whose 
production-oriented, long-term, risk adverse and 
consensus-driven values have often been 
contrasted with the “Anglo-Saxon” approach 
(Jürgens U., Rupp J., 2002). 
One representative company for the German 
business environment is Bayer AG, a global 
company with three divisions - Pharmacy, 
Consumer Health and Culture Science - and a 
business unit for animal health. In 2017, Bayer 
Group included more than 237 companies carrying 
on businesses in 79 countries, having 99.820 
employees worldwide (out of which 31,7% in 
Germany, figure 1) and sales figures of 35 




Figure 1 Bayer AG Employees by Region and 
Gender 
 
Bayer has committed itself to follow the 
principles of sustainable development and its social 
and ethical responsibilities as a corporate citizen. 
Also, Bayer has committed itself to the principles 
of the German Corporate Governance Code and 
provides a good example regarding this matter. 
 
MATERIAL AND METHOD 
 
The purpose of this paper was to describe 
and underline the unique nature of the German 
system of corporate governance, exemplifying 
through Bayer AG case. This paper is entirely 
based on the review and analysis of published 
international literature. The literature review 
process is focused on identifying those important 
features of a Supervisory Board and its members 
that may contribute to the long-term success of a 
company. The main elements analyzed relate to: 
the differences between insider and outsider 
systems, the shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives of corporate governance, the dual 
system of company management (two-tier system), 
board size, number of board meetings, 
composition of the board, board committees, 
representation of banks in the Supervisory Board, 
risk management systems and transparency. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
Types of companies. In Germany, as well 
as for the variant of operating as a sole proprietor, 
there are five major forms of company 
organization as outlined in figure 2. According to 
the German law, like in the case of the majority of 
UE legal frames, there is a formal division of the 
Limited Companies in joint stock companies or 
"Aktiengesellschaften" ("AG") and limited liability 
companies ("Gesellschaften mit beschränkter 
Haftung" or "GmbH"). Bayer AG Company is a 
Public Limited Company and is governed by the 
Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), in 
comparison with the GmbH companies, regulated 
by the Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbH-
Gesetz). Still, some basic principles of the legal 
framework of commercial societies equally apply 















Figure 2 Major forms of company organization in 
Germany (Source: Schmidt, 1997) 
 
Outsider and insider corporate 
governance systems. The German model of 
corporate governance has developed in a unique 
cultural, historical and technological context, and 
is influenced by the particular national economic 
and social conditions, such as the financial 
markets, the banking sector, the structure of 
ownership and the composition of boards of 
directors. Sheridan and Kendall (1992) distinguish 
insider bank-based and outsider market-based 
financial systems of corporate governance (table 
1). 
The Germany's option regarding the 
corporate governance is the insider model, with a 
low number of creditors and participants to the 
social capital (equity holders), and the banks have, 
usually, a persistent presence in the Supervisory 
Board, where they activate in their double position 
– as shareholder and creditor. In Germany, the 
share ownership is heavily concentrated, with over 
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companies, banks and insurance companies 
(Jürgens, Rupp, 2002). 
 
Table 1 
The Distinction Between Insider and Outsider 
Systems (Sheridan and Kendall, 1992) 
 
Outsider system 
 (Anglo-Saxon countries) 
Insider system 
(continental Europe and 
Japan); 




 separation of 
ownership from 
control 
 the association of 
ownership with 
control 
 little incentive for 
outside investors to 
participate in 
corporate control 
 control by related 
parties such as 
banks, partners and 
employees 
 a climate where 
hostile takeovers are 
not unusual, and 
they can be costly 
and antagonistic 
 absence of hostile 
takeovers; in fact, an 
aversion to them 
 the interests of other 
stakeholders are not 
represented 
 the interests of other 
stakeholders are 
represented 
 low commitment of 
outside investors to 
the long-term 
financial strategies 
of the company 
 the intervention of the 
outside investor is 
limited to periods of 
clear financial failure 
 takeovers may 
create monopolies 
 insider systems may 
create collusion and 
cartels. 
 
The distinctive perspectives of corporate 
governance - such as the shareholder and 
stakeholder perspectives - give rise to differences 
in the definition of boards’ roles in the governance 
of corporations (table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Shareholder and Stakeholder Perspectives of 








executive directors are 
fiduciaries of a variety of 
claimants; 
executive and non-
executive directors should 
adopt policies consistent 
with the maximization of 
shareholder wealth; 
executive and non-
executive directors should 
balance pluralistic claims; 
profitability and 
economicefficiency are the 
standardsof efficacy; 
profitability and economic 
efficiency are important in 
addition to survival, long-
term growth and stability; 
the corporation is 
subordinate to the 
interests of shareholders. 
the corporation is seen as 
a superordinate entity. 
 
Two-tier system. Germany promotes the 
dual system of company management (two-tier 
board), a specific characteristic of the German 
legislation regarding the commercial societies 
being the separation between the Management 
Board ("Vorstand"), with executive role, and the 
Supervisory Board ("Aufsichtsrat"), with 
monitoring role. This two-tier management system 
was set up in 1870, being mandatory for the joint 
stock companies and for the limited liability 
companies. The functional separation of these two 
boards avoids the conflicts between the personal 
interests of managers and the interests of their 
companies. 
The Management Board is formed only by 
internal directors, in charge with the company's 
management and representation. The Supervisory 
Board has the task to appoint and monitor the 
management of society. The members of the 
Management Board are not allowed to be also 
members of the Supervisory Board and vice-versa. 
The members of the Management Board are 
appointed for a period of maximum five years, by 
the Supervisory Board. In the same time, this 
establishes also the remuneration for the members 
of the Management Board.  
Board size. The relation between the size of 
the Management Board and its effectiveness may 
be represented by a reversed and flattened "U"-
shaped curve (figure 3). Thus, the more the board's 
number increases, this will take benefit from more 
ideas and knowledge and its effectiveness will 
increase, but, from a certain threshold, the adding 
of extra members will generate coordination-
related conflicts and problems that will diminish 
the Board's effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between number of board 
members and the effectiveness of the board 
(Leimkühler, 1996) 
 
The Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) is 
formed by at least three members and maximum 21 
members, according to the company's declared 
capital. In Germany, the average size of the 
Supervisory Boards was about 13 members at the 
end of the year 2000. One person can hold up to 
ten seats within the supervisory boards of other 
companies, the average number being 2-3 seats per 
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person (Hopt et al, 1998). The Supervisory Board 
of Bayer AG includes a number of 20 members, 
being very close to the maximum size allowed, 
taking into consideration the economic dimension 
of this company.  
The average size of the Supervisory Boards 
in Germany is pretty large, therefore the suspicion 
that they can be negatively affected by the fact that 
they are too large. By the other hand, it is not 
known the threshold of the Board's size beyond 
which the Board's effectiveness can decrease. In 
the same time, this threshold may be different 
according to the nature of businesses carried on by 
the company (Leimkühler, 1996). 
Number of board meetings. The frequency 
of the German Supervisory Board meetings is 
relatively low, with an average value of 3.8 times 
per year. In the case of Bayer AG, the members of 
the Supervisory Board meet themselves once per 
quarter, therefore within the limits of the national 
mean.  
A high number of board meetings does not 
necessarily lead to a more efficient board and a 
better monitoring, if the meetings are conducted in 
a way to serve only the form rather than the 
substance (Schneider and Chan, 2002). 
Composition of the board. In German 
companies with more than 500 employees, under 
Works Constitution Act of 1952 one third of the 
Supervisory Board members must be employee 
representatives. In companies with more than 
2,000 employees, the Co-Determination Act of 
1976 stipulates that the German Supervisory 
Boards are made up of an equal number of 
shareholders and employees' representatives. The 
representatives of capital retain the right to 
nominate the chairman of the Supervisory Board 
who has the casting vote when the two sides are 
deadlocked. 
This situation has the advantage to solve the 
conflicts between the management and the 
employees. Therefore, the employees understand 
better the reasoning of the management's decisions. 
The employees' participation is not related to the 
daily management level, but to the enterprise 
supervision and strategy development level.  
In the case of Bayer AG, out of the 20 
members of the Supervisory Board, 10 members 
are representatives of employees, out of them one 
is the vice-president of the Supervisory Board. 
The representatives of shareholders may be 
internal and external. The internal ones are 
shareholders by themselves and represent 
shareholders in shareholder meetings, with 
authorized voting rights from those shareholders 
they represent. The external representatives of 
shareholders are not shareholders of the company, 
but are members of the Supervisory Board. 
However, they represent the interests of 
shareholders in the Board and they vote on behalf 
of shareholders (figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Composition of the (supervisory) boards 
(Schneider and Chan, 2002) 
 
Board Committees. To acquire flexibility, a 
board may be more efficient in fulfilling its tasks 
by establishing committees to handle some specific 
types of duties. There are many different types of 
committees, whith monitoring functions (audit 
committee, nomination committee, compensation 
committee etc.) and management functions 
(executive committee, finance committee, 
investment committee, corporate rensponsibility 
committee etc.). The audit committees are the most 
popular in Germany. In average, the German 
Supervisory Board has about 2.3 committees 
(Schneider and Chan, 2002). 
In order to increase its efficiency, Bayer AG 
Supervisory Board set up five committees: 
The Presidial Committee, formed by the 
president and vice-president of the Supervisory 
Board, a representative of shareholders and a 
representative of employees. This has the task to 
submit proposals to the Supervisory Board 
regarding the appoitment of the members of the 
Management Board in the case when the necessary 
majority of two thirds is not obtained at the first 
vote within a plenary session.  
The Audit Committee, includes three 
representatives of shareholders and three 
representatives of employees. The meetings take 
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place periodically, four times per year, having the 
role to supervise the process of financial reporting, 
effectiveness and the continuous development of 
the internal control system, risk management 
system, internal audit system, compliance system 
and financial situation audit.  
The Human Resources Committee, 
formed by the president and other three members 
of the Supervisory Board, the parity of 
representation between shareholders and 
employees being mandatory. It prepares the staff 
decisions of the entire Supervisory Board, that 
solves the appointments and the nomination 
revoking of the members of the Management 
Board. In the same time, it is in charge with the 
long-term planning of the succession for the 
Management Board.  
The Nominations Committee, formed by 
the president of the Supervisory Board and the 
other representative of the shareholders from the 
Presidial Committee. It makes the preparations to 
elect the representatives of shareholders in the 
Supervisory Board.  
The Innovation Committee, includes the 
president of the Supervisory Board and other seven 
members, with parity of representation between 
shareholders and representatives of employees. It 
is in charge with the innovation strategy and 
management, strategy of the intellectual property 
protection and the major research and development 
projects of Bayer AG. 
Risk management systems. It has the role 
to recognize as soon as possible the possible 
evolution that might endanger "the life" of a 
company, allowing the adoption of adequate 
measures. The risk management refers to the 
activities of monitoring, controlling and defending 
risks according to plans: risk avoidance, risk 
reduction and risk limitation (active risk 
management), risk shifting and risk providence 
(passive or reactive risk management). (Scharpf, 
1997) Figure 5 presents the elements of a typical 
risk management system.  
 
 
Figure 5: Elements of a typical risk management 
system (Scharpf, 1997) 
 
Opportunity and risk management is an 
integral part of the corporate management at Bayer 
AG. Being a global company carrying on a great 
number of very diverse activities, the Bayer Group 
is frequently exposed to various factors and 
numerous events that may have a strong impact on 
the achievement of the proposed objectives. 
The general responsability for the efficiency 
and the adjustment of operations like the risk 
identification, evaluation, management and 
monitoring belongs to the financial director. The 
establishment of a control system to ensure the risk 
monitoring in the right time allows the appropriate 
management of them, based on the appropiate 
accounting of the commercial transactions and by 
delivering reliable financial data regarding the 
company's situation.  
Representation of banks. Banks play an 
important role in the German corporate 
governance. Historically, this happens due to the 
fact that bank loans have been for long time a 
favorite method of large corporations to raise 
capital (Tekin, 2014). The German banks, 
especially large banks, hold many shares and are 
represented in the boards of the largest German 
public companies. The Bank representatives in the 
Supervisory Board may represent shareholder or 
lender interests (Jürgens and Rupp, 2002). A study 
made by Boehmer in the year 1998 pointed out that 
out of the 231 seats that are destinated to 
shareholders within the Supervisory Boards of a 
number of 24 German companies, circa 16 % 
(meaning 37 sears) belonged to three big banks: 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank. 
In the Supervisory Board of Bayer AG, there 
is only one representative of the banking system 
(Deutsche Bank), which is also one of the ten 
shareholders' representatives. 
Transparency. Following the 
recommendations of the Corporate Governance 
Code, Bayer AG delivers detailed information to 
shareholders, financial analists, mass-media and 
the general public regarding the fiancial position, 
business trends, carried out operations and 
potential risks. The reports are published four 
times per year, inclusively on internet; in the same 
time, information regarding the financial situations 
are given to the interested parts by the occasion of 
press conferences and meetings of financial 
analists. The half-year financial report is 
voluntarily subjected to an audit review by the 
auditor, whose appointment by the Annual 
Stockholders’ Meeting also relates specifically to 
this audit review. 
In addition to the regular reporting, the 
Management Board issue ad-hoc statements on 
development that otherwise might not become 
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publicly known but have the potential to materially 




Germany has adopted the stakeholder model 
to form its corporate governance system, with a 
low number of creditors and participants to the 
social capital. Its focus is to ensure that not just 
shareholders are represented in decision making 
processes. 
The system of co-determination contributes 
to the unique nature of the German system of 
corporate governance. Sizeable and public 
companies are supposed to have a two-tier board 
structure in the German corporate governance 
system: the lower, management board and the 
upper; supervisory board. This dual system 
consists of representation of union interests and 
representation of employer interests, between a 
third and a half of the supervisory board members 
have to be employee or trade union representatives. 
Another distinctive feature of the German 
corporate governance model is the representation 
of banks on the supervisory board. In the 
Supervisory Board of Bayer AG, there is only one 
representative of the banking system (Deutsche 
Bank), 
The average size of the Supervisory Boards 
in Germany is pretty large (13 members), at Bayer 
AG comprising 20 members, of which 10 are 
employees' representatives. 
The number of board meetings is relatively 
low, with an average national value of 3.8 times 
per year. In the case of Bayer AG, the members of 
the Supervisory Board meet themselves four times 
per year.  
The German Supervisory Board has about 
2.3 committees, the audit committees being the 
most popular. Bayer AG Supervisory Board set up 
five committees. 
Transparency is one of the characteristics of 
German companies. Bayer AG informs all 
interested parties about its activities and financial 
situation through reports published four times a 
year, press conferences, meetings of financial 
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